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The present article studies the correlation of true cognition not with the performance of certain 
cognitive or probative procedures by a subject, but with the processes occurring to the object of 
cognition. Therefore, the limits of truth coincide with the inexhaustible regularity or with nature in the 
antique, or Kant’s interpretation. Opposite to science, art deals with principal singularity: its objects 
remain the objects of art as long as “they cannot be confused with anything else”.
The present article considers some “illegal” cognitive intrusions, both “leftwards” from the limits of 
truth where the quantum objects (ensembles) are found, and “rightwards”, where the definiteness of 
the subject and the soul itself are determined.
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The question of the criteria of truth is 
one of the most developed ones in European 
metaphysics and in the philosophy of science. 
Nevertheless, the angle of view often seems 
to be quite stereotypical: knowledge bears 
certain consequences for the knowers; these 
are the consequences that are the first interest 
for epistemology as a theory of cognition as 
such. According to this setup (classification of 
consequences for the knowers) it is a custom to 
differentiate between the deep and superficial 
knowledge, the priority of truth to delusion and 
other truly important things. The development of 
knowledge and the advancement of science (and 
technology) have also been considered from the 
knowers’ point of view. But what if we take a look 
from the position of the object of cognition, of the 
thing exposed to cognition?
Would it be fair to claim that true knowledge 
is not a significant event for the most “truly 
cognized”, for it does not, as any other sort of 
knowledge that remains knowledge, change 
anything in the object of cognition? If the process 
of cognition required digging in the totality 
of the cognized objects, it would have been 
different; but fortunately, the cognition efforts do 
not change anything in the object of cognition. 
Therefore, it means that knowledge bears a 
homeopathic character, while the supreme truth 
is transcendent. 
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And still, it is also appropriate to put this the 
following way: is the cognition occurring “to” 
an object equally harmless to it? If we ask this 
question, it becomes clear that it is not; a part of 
nature is the only thing that is not deprived of 
anything by being under cognition, and this is 
the only space that we can still call the limits of 
truth.
There’s the next statement coming up. The 
glancing contactless reflection does not cover the 
being all over, but only penetrates “from here to 
here”, covering only the things that are anyhow 
relevant for cognition and called nature; that 
sounds pretty much Kant-like. Consequently, 
beyond the mentioned limits the truth changes its 
status if it ever remains the truth, which is a great 
food for thought.
Now it is appropriate to apply the common 
topographic division of the possible truth limits.
On the “left side”, or beyond one edge of 
physis, there is the so-called microworld, and it 
is not there completely. In reality it is one more 
“under-space”, where the being, speaking in 
Hegel’s style, is not totally correlated to itself and 
does not even possess the advantage of simple 
presence. And once it is so, the truth here is 
not formed yet; it still lacks the “sublation”, or 
Aufheben.
Following the description provided by 
quantum mechanics, we witness some exquisite 
objects: quantum ensembles, superpositions, 
quantum entanglement and even the preliminary 
classification of such are yet to come (Claude 
Cohen-Tannoudji, Bernard Diu, Frank Lapoe, 
2000). But the cognitive effort applied to them 
turns into decoherence, after which the objects of 
(n↑, n↓) type do not longer remain the same, but 
disintegrate, losing their previous completeness 
forever.1
This is what it is like to the left from the 
stable universum, when the “multiversum” has 
already been stopped in its endless divergence, 
but the truth has not been set and there is no stable 
being for it, because there is nothing that can be 
harmlessly measured yet. 
Beyond the right limit knowledge loses its 
neutrality to the extent to which its objects turn 
into subjects. Here any “bringing out to the 
open”, revelation, smelling around etc. cause 
ontological harm to the subject, destroying its 
completeness. When a subject’s little shameless 
secret becomes known to anyone else, it turns out 
to cause ontological harm to itself, and sometimes 
the harm is irreparable. 
Only that which is not directly denatured by 
cognition is called nature. It seems to be a nice 
additional definition to the “world of regularities 
and repetitions”, i.e. to the firmly fixed and well-
tempered universum; it is exactly the thing that 
is penetrated by glancing reflection non-stop so 
lightly that every subsequent cognitive effort 
finds the object of cognition in the same state as 
previously. That is why the truth does not resist 
any tests; everything that has been counted can 
be counted over and over again, but it is only true 
when spoken of nature, of substance. It is easy 
to notice that both criteria of Popper, verification 
and falsification, comply with this principle. The 
latter requires the indication of a situation, let’s 
say, of the ultimate experiment, a certain result 
of which proves a theory false. But if a cognitive 
effort and an experiment in particular are able 
to change the structure of the cognized, such 
requirement loses its sense. Because even though 
the dimensions of a table can be measured over 
and over again, it is not true for Schrödinger’s 
cat. Together with the limits of truth, the limits 
of substance are defined: on one side, there is 
the simple supernatural, while the so-called 
“undernatural” remains on the other.
So, the question on whether the world is 
cognizable or not, should be answered as follows: 
yes, to the extent it is not destructed by any 
measurements and other cognitive efforts. Of 
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course, here one can speak of a weird paradox: 
as though, asking whether a mushroom is edible 
or not, one gets the answer that it is edible to the 
extent it is protected from being eaten. Though 
it seems funny, this is exactly how it is with the 
cognizable world. It means that either the world is 
so radically different from a mushroom, which is 
hardly true, or cognition has nothing in common 
with eating, which is something we have to 
admit. We also have to assume that cognition 
is a sort of “anti-interaction” while truth is the 
edibility of the mushrooms that have not been 
eaten. Therefore the limits of truth obtain some 
additional determination. 
If so, the truth is also a function of time, 
or, to be more precise, of chronopoesis; it does 
not become possible and determined at once. 
At first it requires the performance of some 
essential tautologies, of a massive decoherence, 
and only after that the thereby fixed universum 
is considered protected from any changes and 
cognitive procedures from outside.
The consciousness born from the second 
explosion of semiosis is still too young and 
therefore unprotected against measurements, let 
alone “investigations”. Those are only simple 
objects of [n is n] type that can be measured 
harmlessly; fortunately, that is what the so-called 
macroworld predominantly consists of, but the 
quantum ensembles (n↑, n↓) and the subjects 
having souls get lost or transformed as a result of 
the changes.
It brings us to some curious conclusions of 
both practical and metaphysical kind. Thus, if 
“nature” is an oasis of harmless measurability 
and it is the only reason why true cognition is 
possible in its regard, then the “world of the done” 
is something like a reserve within a reserved 
nature (Mamardashvili M.K., 1984). The done 
is the limited territory of the truth, as within its 
limits it is possible to measure and reproduce as 
much as one wishes: the object are cut out for this. 
That is why Mamardashvili was right when he 
said that it is not the done that we cognize, but it 
is by means of the done that we do it: for example, 
we search for the analogues of the done in nature 
and measure them like the things from the human 
everyday life. Mature nature is exposable to such 
procedures, as it has the set limit of truth, though 
the reference of truth is beyond it. 
Art has a different status: it is different and 
it has to be dramatically different from the done; 
it is not “man-made”. In his time Yu.M. Lotman 
emphasized that the basis of art is the function of 
determining selection (i.e. the Einselection which 
forms the self-identical being from the divergence 
of worlds). A stump found in the forest and 
withdrawn from the forest is, therefore, an object 
of art per se; the duration of its “adjustment” 
depends on nothing but some historical 
circumstances. If a computer could generate a 
free flow of word combinations, the poet (artist) 
would be the one who could extract the necessary 
ones as it makes no difference where to get them 
from, from the vague memory experience or a 
spontaneous flow of words (Lotman Yu., 2007).
However, there is one principal moment the 
elimination of which eliminates art as well. That 
is: the selected object remains singular. Unlike 
logic, poetry does not point at any conditions 
under which the same object would have been 
created. So to say, such conditions disappear at 
the moment of extraction, and it is the only reason 
that makes the object of art happen. As for true 
knowledge, it can be considered accomplished 
only if the conditions of obtaining it do not 
disappear.
The paradox of singularity in art is 
comparable to wave-particle duality. Here is an 
object of art, for example, a sculpture in a city 
park. First of all, this object is not separated from 
non-art: the paths leading to it, the ice-cream 
wraps and rocks, the grass around it are not art. 
This far, the conditions for truth and art are the 
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same. But being an object of art, the sculpture is 
singular: if we find it in another park, and then in 
a third one and in any park in general, it will not 
be an object of art anymore: it will be considered 
to be a simple attribute of park like grass, trees 
and paths. As for truth, the opposite is right: if 
we do not find the truth surrounded by the same 
environment, if we come across it only from time 
to time, it cannot be considered truth at all. This 
is the difference of the fine (the beauty) from the 
objective truth.
However, these are not all the difficulties and 
oddities. The analogue of the light interference 
picture is the two incompatible yet inseparable 
effects: non-reduceability and distribution, so 
Walter Benjamin did the same in art studies as 
Bohr and Heisenberg in nature research. Let us 
think of the following. It is possible to eliminate 
a piece of art in two ways: either to erase it from 
the face of the earth (from the memory) or copy 
and distribute it. It sounds clear as both of them 
kill the singularity. The answer to the question 
which of the ways is more radical is not so easy 
to find.
Physical destruction of a singular object 
seems irreparable: there is a bitter list of 
irretrievably lost masterpieces. However, 
the phenomenon of a gaping hole calling for 
restoration activates some wave function of art: 
the search for the lost singularity is just the same 
business for an artist as creation of a new one. 
Moreover, that may be the lost singularity that 
cannot be eliminated by means of distribution 
as the restoration versions.
Reproductions are a different matter. Here 
is Pushkin doing his capturing, presenting as a 
singular object, a poem:
A magic moment I remember: 
I raised my eyes and you were there, 
A fleeting vision, the quintessence 
Of all that’s beautiful and rare.
This was addressed to Anna Kern, thereby 
revealing and immortalizing her singularity. 
She is the only woman, the image and the cause 
of it; she is the lost physical singularity that 
has not left the poetic singularity no matter 
how many times the poem is re-typed: it never 
loses its sacred power. But let us suppose that 
a biographer of Pushkin discovers that the poet 
had a custom to send this very poem to any 
conquered woman after an erotic act: “A magic 
moment I remember” etc. Would the poetic 
power still linger in these lines? In the event 
of true knowledge the truth would, no doubt, 
have been served with more and more of new 
confirmations. But art lives beyond the limits 
of truth of the knowers, therefore this paradox 
is only resolved with laughter, because it is the 
laughter that accompanies destruction of such a 
work of art. Thereby we reveal another important 
peculiarity of truth: it may be shining, stunning, 
sad, severe, stubborn, but it seems like truth can 
never be funny…
So what is art going through in the era of 
technical reproduction? First of all, distinctive 
stratification. A great number of objects fallout 
from the scope of art for lacking singularity 
along with all the possible features of beauty. 
For example, that is what happens with all the 
fashion jewellery of the world, a scattering of 
unique objects, where the equal and all and the 
same coincide. In some other cases the difference 
of the original from its copies is maintained: here 
we could say that all copies are just printouts, 
while the original in its legal appearance is 
nothing but a privileged printout, like the one we 
cannot point at. This is where the stored art and 
created art makeup different echelons: instead of 
an object of art we get a copy or a sample, but 
it only means that the new, created work of art 
will be recognized as such only when it deserves 
being copied, considering that every copy is not a 
work of art any more.
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Now it is the time to think on the three 
integrated questions altogether: 
Is the mushroom edible? 
Is the world cognizable? 
Is a work of art unique?
I believe the sequence of answers is the 
following. The mushroom is edible if it has ever 
been eaten: i.e. if it has been consumed as an 
object and nothing happened to the subject. The 
world is cognizable if after the applied cognition 
efforts it remained unchanged (and the new act 
of cognition finds it in the same form) and the 
subject has changed into the knower.
A work of art is unique if the efforts of 
reproduction (something between consumption 
and cognition) are applied to it, and the obtained 
results, no matter the number, do not abolish the 
ontological status of the original.
It opens space for a great number of remarks, 
for example: the world can remain cognizable even 
if it is not being cognized, if the act of cognition is 
deposited in such a way that it will occur sooner 
or later. But a work of art cannot remain unique 
(and even remain art) if it is not copied at least 
on the level of perception. I.e. its involvement in 
temporal relations is set in a stricter way.
Moving further, let us study the frontier 
cases of non-copying and copying of art, that 
transform singularity into regularity. Art is found 
in between them, i.e., like truth, art has its limits. 
On the left there is the “non-art” recognized as 
such for the reason of its “unartfulness’, such as 
graphomania, cacophony, kitsch… Such opuses 
are not copied or reproduced at least because 
it never enters anyone’s mind. On the right we 
deal with industry where copying destructs 
(eliminates) the singularity of the object, due 
to which, despite its “artfulness”, the object, let 
it be earrings, stunningly beautiful wallpaper, 
an exquisite bag, remains nothing but “fashion 
jewellery”. 
Now the only thing that remains is to find 
out how these limits, truths and beauties correlate 
with each other. But first of all we need go deep 
into one mysterious circumstance: how can a 
reproduced work of art preserve its singularity? 
Because this paradox peculiarity is the feature 
that makes an object a work of art. The beautiful 
woolpack clouds are not classified as works of art 
just because they are not copyable, that is why 
it is only their image that can be a work of art, 
not themselves. The gods who could sculpt the 
woolpack and thunderous clouds would no doubt 
compete for the title of the best artist, but the 
question is, would us mortals be able to understand 
whether they are dealing with the originals or 
reproductions? One way or another, we see that 
the protection of a piece from profanatory copying 
is a convention. For the artist making gravures, 
for example, the originals are the first five prints; 
for a poet the layout original is a poem, for a 
composer it is a score; but here the list doubles and 
gets more confusing. What is it for a conductor? 
An actor? Or why is a work of a sound recording 
engineer not a work of art? This confusion does 
nothing but confirms the conventional nature of 
the right edge which, however, does not abolish 
the singularity limit itself, comparable to the 
limits of truth, but simultaneously incomparable 
to it.
With all these differences and oppositions 
we get two mushrooms that seem edible for 
the reason of their “uneatenness”; the truth is 
inexhaustible regularity, and art is inexhaustible 
singularity. It is also important to remark that 
the regularity and singularity themselves can 
also be exhaustible. Thus, the routine human 
life happens in its simple exhaustible regularity 
and the exhaustible singularity of presence. It is 
thereby unartful and untruthful as a whole, but it 
is what the miracle of vitality is about.
The situation changes if we draw a dividing 
range within the scope of cognitive efforts. The 
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result of applying such cognitive efforts in general 
is the multiplication of inexhaustible regularity, 
as our knowledge differs from the objects of 
nature with at least the same unwearability. Let 
us compare the two theses:
1. No matter how much the Earth attracts 
the Moon, it won’t hurt the Moon.
2. No matter how much a word taken from 
a dictionary is used in these or those contexts, it 
is not threatened with exhaustion. 
The second statement looks even more 
evident: if in the process of attraction the 
mutually attracted objects together with 
attraction itself may be somehow consumed, 
then in the process of signification, the sign 
retains its meaning without consuming it: 
therefore, it is the only case where the true and 
inexhaustible regularity is reached. However, 
if we speak of the effort of the cognition 
subject, of the effort applied by ego cogito, 
the regularity is violated, and the violation 
is principal. Let us say so: credibility is built 
with the method of approaching, by means of 
assimilation with the truth: but the thing is that 
the truth is not similar to itself. Just like the 
happening of comprehension, the first-person 
cognition, the truth needs to occur as though 
it occurs for the first time: no matter what 
inexhaustible regularity it discovers, the truth 
has to remain my personal singularity, otherwise 
the happening of cognition will never happen. 
In other words, the true cognition, changing 
nothing in the cognized, radically changes the 
knower himself, and without the satisfaction 
of these two conditions the true cognition 
(cognition of the truth) is impossible.
1 The Einselection procedure, i.e. determined selection (selection for cognition, for example), brings to “breaking the com-
pleteness” of the object. The favourite example of such in quantum mechanics is Schrödinger’s cat.
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Границы истинного познания  
(Метафизический и топологический аспект)
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Университетская наб., 7-9
В статье рассматривается зависимость истинного познания не от выполнения субъектом 
определенных познавательных или доказательных процедур, а от того, что происходит с 
предметом познания, с познаваемым. Тем самым диапазон истины совпадает с неисчерпаемой 
регулярностью или с природой в античном и кантовском понимании этого слова. В 
противоположность науке искусство имеет дело с принципиальной сингулярностью, его 
объекты остаются объектами искусства до тех пор, пока их «невозможно спутать ни с чем 
другим».
В данной работе рассматриваются и «незаконные» познавательные вторжения – как влево 
от диапазона истины, где находятся квантовые объекты (ансамбли), так и «вправо», где 
заданы определенность субъекта и сама душа.
Ключевые слова: диапазон истины, сингулярность, квантовые объекты.
Научная специальность: 09.00.00.  – философские науки.
